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LESSONS LEARNED, LESSONS LOST:
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT'S FAILED
EXPERIMENT WITH PENAL SEVERITY
Teresa A. Miller*
ABSTRACT
This article traces the evolution of "get tough" sentencing and correc-
tions policies that were touted as the solution to a criminal justice system
widely viewed as "broken" in the mid-1970s. It draws parallels to the
adoption some twenty years later of harsh, punitive policies in the immigra-
tion enforcement system to address perceptions that it is similarly "bro-
ken," policies that have embraced the theories, objectives and tools of crim-
inal punishment, and caused the two systems to converge. In discussing
the myriad of harms that have resulted from the convergence of these two
systems, and the criminal justice system's recent shift away from severity
and toward harm reduction, this article suggests that the criminal justice
system has been more proactive in compensating for its excesses than the
immigration enforcement system and discusses the reasons why.
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INTRODUCTION
A. An Immigrant Experience in 1900
Annie Moore, an Irish girl from County Cork arrived in New York City
by boat on January 1, 1892. Departing Ireland from Queenstown on De-
cember 20, 1891 aboard the S.S. Nevada, after twelve days at sea Annie ar-
rived at Ellis Island on Thursday evening, December 31st. She would be
processed through Ellis Island the following morning, New Year's Day,
which was also Annie's fifteenth birthday. Accompanied by her two
younger brothers on a quest to join parents who had already landed in New
York, Annie has the distinction of being the first person to pass through the
newly opened Ellis Island Immigration Station.'
On that Inaugural day, 700 immigrants arriving in three separate ships
were processed at Ellis Island. 2 At the time, the federal Treasury Depart-
1. The fate of Annie Moore-the "rosy, cheeked Irish girl" who was celebrated as the
first immigrant to enter the United States through the golden gateway of Ellis Island-was
mythologized after history lost track of Annie. For generations, it was popularly believed
that the plucky immigrant girl went west to seek her fortune in Texas. However, a genea-
logical discovery in 2006 exposed the true fate of Annie Moore, the girl who was memoria-
lized by bronze statues in New York Harbor and Ireland, and commemorated in story and
song as the first of some twelve million immigrants to arrive at Ellis Island. In reality, three
years after arriving in the United States, Annie married an engineer and salesman at the Ful-
ton Fish Market, the son of a German-born baker. They had at least eleven children, only
five of whom survived to adulthood. See Sam Roberts, A Great-Great-Great-Great Day for
Ellis Island's Annie, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 16, 2006, at B3. She lived the rest of her
"hardscrabble, immigrant life" within a few square blocks on Manhattan's Lower East Side
and died of heart failure at the age of forty-seven. She was buried with six of her children in
a cemetery in Queens. Sam Roberts, First Through Gates of Ellis I., She Was Lost. Now
She's Found, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2006, at Al.
2. Ellis Island Timeline, STATUE OF LIBERTY-ELLIS ISLAND FOUNDATION, http://www.
ellisisland.org/genealogy/ellis-island-timeline.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2010).
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ment-home of the newly-created federal Bureau of Immigration-was
charged with enforcing a modest set of admission qualifications, including
proof that the immigrant was not a criminal, a lunatic, a pauper, or dis-
eased.3 The ship's captain had supplied to the Collector of Customs a ma-
nifest listing the names of all the passengers, and an inspector had collected
a federal tax of roughly fifty cents per arriving immigrant to pay into a fed-
eral immigrant welfare fund.4
The screening process was administrative and extensive. After leaving
the ship and entering the inspection station at Ellis Island, Annie, her
brothers, and the 700 other new arrivals walked up a steep stairway leading
to the Registry Room in the main building, past doctors who looked over
each of them and occasionally wrote something in chalk on their coats: "L"
for lame, "H" for heart trouble, "E" for eye problems, "K" for hernia, "G"
for goiter, and "X" for mental deficiency.5 Those who were sick were re-
moved from the line and denied entry.6 The first examination was for lice,
and those infested had their heads shaved.7 Then, each immigrant had to
remove his or her clothing to be examined for skin disease. 8 During the
eye exam, each immigrant had their upper eyelid flipped back with a
hooked instrument to allow a doctor to examine the eyeball for trachoma, a
contagious eye disease.9 After waiting to reach the doctors who did the
physical examinations, immigrants underwent mental examinations as
3. The Immigration Act of 1891 gave the job of processing immigrants to the federal
government and created the Bureau of Immigration within the Treasury Department in re-
sponse to public outcry for greater, more systematic, governmental regulation of the admis-
sion and adjustment of "new" immigrant populations. STEPHAN THERNSTROM, HARVARD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ETHNIC GROuPs 490-91 (1980). The law also barred persons
suffering from certain contagious diseases, those convicted of crimes or misdemeanors, po-
lygamists, and persons likely to become "public charges." Id. at 491. Those deemed unqua-
lified for admission were deported at the expense of the shipping companies. Id. Lastly, the
1891 Act directed that any alien who unlawfully entered the United States be deported. Act
of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 10, 26 Stat. 1084, 1086.
4. On August 3, 1882, Congress passed an act to regulate immigration that provided
for the levying, collection, and payment of a duty of fifty cents for each and every passenger
arriving by steam or sail vessel from a foreign port. The Act called for the duty to be paid
into the federal Treasury toward a special immigrant welfare fund used "to defray the ex-
penses of regulating immigration under this [A]ct, and for the care of immigrants arriving in
the United States, for the relief of such as are in distress, and for the general purposes and
expenses of carrying this act into effect." Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 1, 22 Stat. 214,
214.
5. John Parascandola, Doctors at the Gate: PHS at Ellis Island, 113 PUB. HEALTH REP.
83, 84 (1998).
6. Id. at 85.
7. Id. at 84.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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well.' 0 Arriving immigrants who passed health inspection were then inter-
viewed by clerks who recorded vital statistics and background informa-
tion. 1
Annie's immigration experience, and that of many other Europeans ar-
riving at Ellis Island near the turn of the century reflected the recent federa-
lization of a nascent immigration system.12 The examinations took place in
a special, centralized receiving station constructed by, and staffed with,
federal dollars, and supervised by the Department of the Treasury. 3 The
goal of this process was to determine the eligibility of arriving immigrants
for admission based upon a limited (although growing) set of exclusion
grounds and to efficiently dispatch the new arrivals to their destinations.' 4
Those who did not appear to qualify for admission would be identified by
inspectors as they wound their way through the long inspection lanes,
pulled out for secondary inspection, and possibly held until a return voyage
could be arranged.'"
During this era, even immigrants who were processed through Ellis Isl-
and and admitted to the United States could subsequently be deported on
the basis of either (1) error during the inspection process (e.g., the arriving
immigrant lied about a previous criminal conviction), or (2) the arriving
immigrant's violation of the conditions of admission (e.g., becoming a pub-
lic charge within one year after admission, a ground for deportation under
the Immigration Act of 1891).16 These subsequent deportation proceedings
were initiated not as an exercise of social control over individuals long res-
ident in the United States, but as an extension of the power to admit (or
refuse admission to) arriving aliens-a power that was an immediate part
of the exclusion process.' 7 Despite the harsh consequences, these sorts of
deportation laws-based upon a contractual model of arriving immigrants
agreeing to abide by conditions of admission during a "probationary" pe-
10. Id. at 85-86.
11. THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 491.
12. Id. ("In 1891 Congress finally established a permanent administration for the nation-
al control of immigration in the form of a superintendent of immigration within the Treasury
Department.").
13. Id. (Thernstrom refers to Ellis Island as a "federal station").
14. VINCENT CANNATO, AMERICAN PASSAGE: THE HISTORY OF ELLIS ISLAND 60 (2010).
15. Roughly twenty percent of immigrants arriving at Ellis Island were set aside for fur-
ther inspection. Vincent Cannato, Coming to America: Ellis Island and New York City, HIS-
TORY Now (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.gilderlehrman.org/historynow/03_2007/
historian2.php.
16. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, §§ 1-11, 26 Stat. 1084.
17. DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 5-6
(2007).
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riod of one year (later expanded to three years in 1903)-were nevertheless
consistent with traditional civil and regulatory models.
18
B. An Immigrant Experience in 2000
Consider the experience of Luis Quezada nearly 100 years later. Mr.
Quezada had already crossed the border into the United States and was re-
siding in Colorado. 19 Like Annie Moore, Quezada came to the United
States to reunite with family members. One Saturday afternoon, Mr. Que-
zada was taken into custody on a criminal arrest warrant for failure to ap-
pear in court on a traffic violation.20 That same day the Jefferson County
Jail received an immigration detainer stating that Mr. Quezada was being
investigated by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to determine
whether he was subject to removal for unlawful presence in the United
States and that the jail was required to detain Quezada for forty-eight
hours. 21 The following Tuesday, Quezada appeared before a judge who
sentenced him to time served and ordered him released from custody.
22
Shortly after the judge ordered Quezada released, the jail notified ICE by
fax that Quezada was "ready for pick-up." 23  By that Friday, Quezada
maintains, the county's state criminal and federal statutory authority to con-
tinue detaining him had expired,24 yet officials at the Jefferson County jail
did not release him until forty-seven days later despite repeated protests
from Quezada and his family members.2 5 The ACLU is now suing Jeffer-
son County on constitutional grounds as well as state tort law grounds for
Quezada's wrongful imprisonment.26
Contrast the experiences of Annie Moore and Luis Quezada. Whereas
Annie was screened for admissibility upon arrival at Ellis Island, where a
deportation would be initiated through direct contact with federal immigra-
tion authorities, Quezada came to the attention of immigration authorities
18. Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts
About Why HardLaws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1889, 1909-10 (2000).
19. Second Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 2, Quezada v. Mink, No.
1: 10CV00879 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Second Amended Complaint].
20. Id. at 1.
21. Id. at 5; see also Felisa Cardona, ACLU Sues Jeffco Sheriff Over ICE Hold, DENVER
POST, Apr. 22, 2010, at B2.
22. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at 5.
23. Id. at 1 17.
24. Id. at 19, 21. Immigration regulations provide for the initiation or continuation of
custody of an alien against whom an ICE detainer has been lodged for a maximum of forty-
eight hours, not including weekends. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2010).
25. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 19, at $ 21; Cardona, supra note 21.
26. Cardona, supra note 21.
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indirectly through contact with local law enforcement in a criminal matter.
As a criminal offender, Quezada was afforded Due Process of law, and the
matter of the unanswered court summons that triggered Quezada's initial
detention was processed in a timely fashion. However, the matter of Que-
zada's immigration status-treated as a quasi-criminal matter-subjected
him to lengthy, and arguably unlawful incarceration. Authorities operating
within the idiom of criminal law enforcement misused a civil immigration
law tool (i.e., immigration detainer) to exercise custody over an individual
absent the customary checks on the discretionary actions of law enforce-
ment agents. Despite repeated requests by family members and the detai-
nee himself, Quezada was denied release from custody, opportunity to post
bail, and a fair and prompt hearing.27
The contrast between these two stories demonstrates that immigration
law, a set of rules designed in part as a civil and federal means of regulat-
ing the inclusion, exclusion and expulsion of non-citizens has, in the twen-
ty-first century, imported many of the theories, methodologies, and most
significantly, objectives of criminal law enforcement. This has occurred
despite of important distinctions between a civil immigration system of
regulation and the criminal punishment system.
The power to regulate immigration is vested in the federal government
and derives primarily from sovereign powers enumerated in the Constitu-
tion. 28 The power to admit, exclude, and expel foreign subjects is unders-
tood to be "inherent" in the sovereignty and nationhood of the United
States.29 An elaborate web of federal agencies involved in such diverse
27. Id.
28. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4 (providing that Congress shall have power "[t]o estab-
lish a[n] uniform Rule of Naturalization").
29. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606-09 (1889) ("For local interests the
several states of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with for-
eign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power. To preserve its independence,
and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every
nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated. It
matters not in what form such aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign
nation acting in its national character or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us.
The government, possessing the powers which are to be exercised for protection and securi-
ty, is clothed with authority to determine the occasion on which the powers shall be called
forth; and its determinations, so far as the subjects affected are concerned, are necessarily
conclusive upon all its departments and officers .... The power of exclusion of foreigners
being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, as a part
of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time
when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be
granted away or restrained on behalf of anyone." (emphasis added)). The power to regulate
immigration has even been interpreted as predating and superseding the Constitution. Al-
though subsequently criticized on logical and historical grounds, the Supreme Court has
held that the federal government's power of external sovereignty was independent of the
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operations as collecting taxes on imports, issuing visas, processing citizen-
ship applications, patrolling the border, apprehending and removing a
growing class of deportable non-citizens, and hearing administrative ap-
peals of immigration judges' decisions are all consolidated under the De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS). 30 As such, immigration law oper-
ates as a civil system, highly administrative in nature, and entirely distinct
from criminal law enforcement. For example, the processing of citizenship
applications for naturalization is an administrative process, as is the inves-
tigation, apprehension, and deportation of immigrants who cross the border
into the United States without inspection, so-called "illegal aliens." 31
In contrast, the power of states and the federal government to regulate
criminal conduct stems from the Tenth Amendment Reserve Clause (re-
serving to the states all unspecified regulatory or "police" powers that the
Constitution did not explicitly forbid states from exercising),32 and from
the Commerce Clause in article 1, section 8 of the Constitution.33 Preemi-
nent scholar Stephen Legomsky articulated the core incongruity stemming
from the convergence of aspects of these two systems when he observed
that immigration law has adopted the language of criminal law enforcement
without affording those subject to its coercive power the same Due Process
protections as those who are criminally charged.34
The immigration system has not simply imitated the techniques of crim-
inal punishment, it has become a hybrid system of "crimmigration" as
Constitution, deriving instead from "necessary concomitants of nationality." United States
v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
30. This has occurred since 2003, when the Homeland Security Act (HSA), Pub. L. No.
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), was passed in response to long-standing concerns about the
bureaucratic inefficiency of the (former) Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
31. The extent to which this distinction is widely overlooked by a large segment of the
American public, and broadly unpopular was vividly illustrated during the 2008 presidential
campaign when Rudy Giuliani, mayor of New York City and a frontrunner for the Republi-
can nomination, appeared to shock the nation (and seriously jeopardize his candidacy) by
publicly acknowledging that "illegal" immigration is not a crime. During a CNN interview
with Glenn Beck, Giuliani stated: "[I]t's not a crime. I know that's very hard for people to
understand, but it's not a federal crime." Giuliani went on to explain: "I was U.S.
[A]ttorney in the [S]outhem [D]istrict of New York. So believe me, I know this. [W]hen
you throw an immigrant out of the country, it's not a criminal proceeding. It's a civil pro-
ceeding." Interview by Glenn Beck, CNN, with Rudy Giuliani, GOP Presidential Candidate
(Sept. 7, 2007), available at http://archive.glennbeck.com/news/09072007.shtml.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. X (providing "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the People").
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing that Congress shall have power "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several States and with the Indian Tribes").
34. Stephen Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 469, 471 (2007).
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criminal and immigration law enforcement procedures have converged, al-
lowing non-U.S. citizens to be treated as citizen criminals without the (ac-
companying) procedural protections afforded to those persons who are cri-
minally charged.35 This has created an asymmetry, that is, a distortion of
both the immigration system (criminalized) and the criminal system (pro-
cedural exceptionalism for its non-citizen subjects).
My argument, put simply, is that the conflation of civil and criminal
processes and standards undermines the rationale and objectives of both
systems. It calls into question the legitimacy of immigration laws at the
same time that it degrades the traditional operation of the criminal justice
system, by creating a kind of civil "exceptionalism" within criminal law
enforcement, a situation not envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution
when they ratified the Bill of Rights.
This article will begin with a review of the Due Process protections that
are at the foundation of the criminal justice system, trace the development
of harsh reforms that dramatically altered the landscape of criminal justice
in the 1980s and 90s, and describe the growing retreat from penal severity
that is currently underway in response to a range of harms that gradually
undermined the legitimacy of the system and caused it to become economi-
cally unsustainable.
I will then describe the process by which immigration law has similarly
adopted penal severity by embracing the theories, objectives, and mechan-
isms of criminal punishment. By linking its civil enforcement and deporta-
tion mechanisms to criminal law enforcement and incarceration, several
aspects of the immigration system are said to be "converging" with the
criminal system.36 I will chart the harms that have resulted from the coupl-
ing of these two traditionally distinct systems, and describe the structural
barriers that impede the immigration system from addressing these harms
and embracing the lessons learned from the criminal justice system's failed
experiment with penal severity.
35. Id.; Teresa Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New
Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 660 (2003) [hereinafter Miller, Citizenship & Severity]
(describing a hybrid crime-immigration control system created by the convergence of immi-
gration regulation and crime control).
36. Daniel Kanstroom has written extensively about the convergence of deportation law
and criminal punishment. KANSTROOM, supra note 17; Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation and
Justice: A Constitutional Dialogue, 41 B.C. L. REv. 771 (2000); Kanstroom, supra note 18;
Daniel Kanstroom, Reaping the Harvest: The Long, Complicated, Crucial Rhetorical Strug-
gle Over Deportation, 39 CoNN. L. REv. 1911 (2007).
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I. RECENT HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. The Severity Revolution & Mass Incarceration
The modem criminal justice system's establishment was roughly concur-
rent with the establishment of the Union.37 The framers of the Constitution
affirmatively provided individuals under police investigation, charged with
a crime, apprehended or otherwise held in the custody of law enforcement
with specific rights, including Due Process, freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures, bail, legal counsel, and humane punishment.3 8
These rights were conferred on all persons by virtue of the degree of go-
vernmental power being brought to bear upon them with no limitation
based upon citizenship. An adversarial criminal system was designed to
check the discretionary, and potentially unlimited, authority of law en-
forcement officials to deprive citizens of their liberty largely through the
interposition of neutral judicial authority.39 With fresh memories of British
writs of assistance and general warrants, the signatories to the United States
Constitution and the Bill of Rights devised a system that guarantees to
those whose liberty is being curtailed procedures designed to reduce the
risk of wrongful exercise of governmental law enforcement police power.4 °
As David Garland observed, with the establishment of the penitentiary sys-
tem in the late 1700s, these rights reflected a relatively stable set of values
and objectives that had endured within the field of criminal punishment for
37. See 1 WAYNE R. LA FAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 266-68 (3rd ed. 2007).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hous-
es, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."); U.S.
CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public dan-
ger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation."); U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impar-
tial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fense."); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
39. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 37, at 171-89, 194-205.
40. See id. at 267-76.
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two centuries, such as the minimizing of pain and cruelty in the penal
process and reformation of the offender through individualized justice.41
These once-settled notions about criminal law enforcement and punishment
changed abruptly with the ascendancy of neo-liberal political ideas and the
onset of the War on Drugs.
In 1982, President Reagan gave a speech at the Department of Justice
that foreshadowed radical changes within the American criminal justice
system.42 He boldly asserted that "our criminal justice system has broken
down" and that "it just isn't working."4 3 His proposed response to this cri-
sis would culminate in a "severity revolution"' that would dramatically al-
ter fundamental objectives, rationales and mechanisms of crime control,
and change public opinion about the criminal justice system and the people
subject to its authority for decades.
Characterizing crime as an epidemic, Reagan cited as causes: lax pursuit,
prosecution, and punishment of criminals; over-investment in social wel-
fare programs; and privileging the rights of repeat offenders over those of
the innocent as its causes. 45 Reagan described the "increasing organized
crime involvement in drug abuse" as an "invisible, lawless empire." 46
Lauding tough new state sentencing reforms that meted out severe sen-
tences for repeat offenders, President Reagan called for a new era of "swift
and sure" punishment.47 He outlined eight new crime-fighting initiatives,
one of which was the allocation of millions of dollars for new prison and
jail construction.48
One of the states pioneering tough new sentencing reforms was New
York. New York State has the ignominious distinction of leading the Unit-
41. David Garland is a British social scientist who analyzed similarities between harsh
crime control reforms in the United States and the United Kingdom in the 1980s and 1990s
as a reflection of social insecurity, risk, and control crises constituting "late modernity."
Garland observed that these conditions played a crucial role in shaping responses to crime
control in the United States, United Kingdom, and other developed countries. Jonathan Si-
mon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining America's Severity Revolution, 56 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 217, 218-19 (2001).
42. President Ronald Reagan, Speech to U.S. Dep't of Justice (Oct. 15, 1982) [hereinaf-
ter Reagan Speech], in Text of President's Speech on Drive Against Crime, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
15, 1982, at A20.
43. Id.
44. The term "severity revolution" was coined by Joseph Kennedy to describe the over-
whelming and unprecedented political consensus behind increases in the severity of criminal
punishment in the 1980s and 1990s. See Joseph Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the
Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 832 (2000).
45. Reagan Speech, supra note 42, at A20.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
226 [Vol. XXXVIII
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ed States in harshly punishing drug users alongside the dealers who were
once the primary target of drug enforcement laws.49 In passing the 1973
Rockefeller Drug Laws 50 in tandem with the Second Felony Offender
Law,5 ' the New York State Assembly imposed harsh mandatory minimum
prison terms for the possession or sale of relatively small amounts of con-
trolled substances as well as for any second felony conviction within ten
years, regardless of the circumstances of the conviction or the nature of the
offenses.52 The Rockefeller Drug Laws marked an unprecedented shift to-
ward addressing drug abuse and addiction through criminal punishment,
rather than medical and public health interventions. The Second Felony
Offender Law sent scores of two-time non-violent felony offenders to pris-
on.53 Together, these harsh laws usurped the power of judges to use discre-
tion in sentencing decisions, and flooded New York's prisons with non-
violent, low-level drug offenders even before Reagan gave his 1982 ad-
dress.
Furthermore, these laws dramatically reconfigured the size, composition,
and complexion of New York State's prison population. Annual drug
commitments to prison, which had totaled 470 in 1970, rose to 8521 by
1999,54 browning the prison population considerably. By 1999, African
American and Latino men and women comprised 90% of all New York
49. See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, Measuring Culpability by Measuring Drugs? Three
Reasons to Reevaluate the Rockefeller Drug Laws, 63 ALBANY L. REv. 777, 777-78 (2000).
50. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.00-.65, 221.00-.55 (McKinney's 2010) (incorporating pro-
visions of the Rockefeller Drug Laws).
51. PENAL LAW § 70.06.
52. As New York Times columnist Clyde Haberman described the stage upon which
enactment of the Rockefeller Drug Laws was set:
Nelson A. Rockefeller was governor then. Drug criminals had New York by the
throat in one of the city's periodic heart-of-darkness phases. Rockefeller wanted
to show he could be tough as nails with dope dealers. The result was statutes that
eternally bear his name in common idiom. Their essence was to send drug felons
to prison for very long stretches, with sentences made mandatory and leniency
rendered unacceptable even for first-time offenders.
Clyde Haberman, Thirty-five years of Rockefeller Drug Laws, and Hope there Won't be
Thirty-six, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2008, at Editorial BI.
53. ANNE-MARIE CUSAC, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE CULTURE OF PUNISHMENT IN AMER-
ICA 177 (2009). In 2001, New York State sent 2586 drug offenders with no prior violent
felony convictions to prison. LEGAL ACTION CTR., A-7978, COST SAVINGS THAT WOULD
ACCRUE TO NEW YORK UNDER THE ASSEMBLY'S DRUG LAW REFORM BILL 3 (2003), availa-
ble at http://lac.org/doc library/lac/publications/Assembly%20cost%20savings.pdf
54. JUDITH GREENE & MARC MAUER, DOWNSCALING PRISONS: LESSONS FROM FOUR
STATES 6 n. 1 (citing N.Y. State Dep't of Crim. Justice Serv., 1999 Crime and Justice Annual
Report), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/docs/publications/publications/inc_
DownscalingPrisons2010.pdf.
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State prisoners incarcerated for a drug offense." Between 1988 and 1999
the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) added two maximum-
security prisons, fourteen medium-security prisons, and four minimum-
security prisons, increasing overall system capacity by 56% (from 41,242
to 72,951).56
New York's tough sentencing reforms established a pattern of increa-
singly harsh policies. Labeled the "War on Drugs," these laws and policies
upended settled notions about the objectives of criminal punishment, and
typified law enforcement's approach to contraband drug abuse and sales.
They also produced a myriad of social harms in the process. As states like
Texas, California, and Florida followed New York's lead by toughening
criminal penalties for drug offenders, Congress passed federal sentencing
guidelines which limited the discretion of judges to set indeterminate crim-
inal penalties and parole boards to decide when-within the sentencing
range-the offender was sufficiently rehabilitated to be conditionally re-
leased on parole. 57 Instead, Congress imposed a table for calculating sen-
tences on the basis of the conduct involved in the offense and the offend-
er's criminal history, with optional upward and downward adjustments
based upon a range of aggravating or mitigating factors.58 Many states fol-
lowed suit. By 2001, sixteen states had abolished their parole boards and
replaced them with determinate sentencing regimes.59 Guideline sentenc-
ing explicitly rejected rehabilitation as an objective of incarceration, ab-
olished parole, and effectively transferred sentencing decisions to the dis-
cretion of prosecutors laying the charges.6 °
B. Penal Severity Produces a Range of Harms
These severity reforms---determinate sentencing, mandatory minimum
sentences, repeat offender enhancements, elimination of parole, and dra-
matic expansion of the prison system-inevitably followed produced a
range of harms. Court-stripping and categorical sentencing increased the
55. Symposium Notes from the Field. Challenges of Indigent Criminal Defense, 12 N.Y.
CITY L.REv. 203, 229 (2008) (citing Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S.
Prison Populations Revisited, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 743, 754 (1993)).
56. GREENE & MAUER, supra note 54, at 7.
57. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837.
58. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (2009).
59. JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY
13 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2003).
60. LISA SEGHETTI & ALISON SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31340, FEDERAL SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES: BACKGROUND, LEGAL ANALYSIS, AND POLICY OPTIONS 14 (2007).
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federal prison population by more than 600%.61 Between 1983 and 1998,
the rate of prison drug offender admissions increased eighteen-fold for
Hispanics and twenty-six-fold for African Americans, in comparison to
seven-fold for whites. 62 The unprecedented expansion of the prison popu-
lation led to prison over-crowding which, in turn, endangered the physical
safety of inmates and correctional officers alike.63 The prison industry be-
came the panacea for rural factory-based communities saddled with a de-
clining industrial economy that saw their fortunes rise (or fall) on their abil-
ity to attract prison construction.64 Thus prison expansion became a growth
industry, with built-in incentives for harsh sentencing legislation and crim-
inal convictions. With state and federal prisons holding a larger population
of prisoners for longer terms of incarceration under considerably harsher
conditions of confinement, three decades into the severity revolution, pris-
oners are being released at the end of long, determinate sentences at alarm-
ing rates into a substantially weakened system for supervising them.65 In
contrast to parolees of the 1970s, the average inmate coming home today
has served a longer prison sentence, been more disconnected from family
and friends, has spent more time in highly restrictive confinement (e.g.
keeplock, solitary confinement, administrative segregation), has a higher
incidence of addiction and mental illness, is less educated, and is less em-
ployable. 6
6
C. "Severity Fatigue" Prompts Ameliorative Reforms
Nearly four decades after Reagan's neo-liberal endorsement of penal se-
verity, the criminal justice system has begun to confront the negative con-
sequences-both intended and unintended-of its severity revolution.
Moderating programs and policies have filtered into the criminal system,
driven primarily by economic limitations, reduced capacity, and a growing
awareness that the United States simply cannot incarcerate its way out of
the problems of drug addiction, mental illness, and poverty. These criminal
61. Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Failure of Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural
Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1329 (2005) (citing ALLEN J. BECK & DARRELL K. GIL-
LIARD, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, NCJ 151654, PRISONERS IN 1994, at 1 (1995)).
62. PETERSILIA, supra note 59, at 28.
63. See Nola Joyce, A View of the Future: The Effect of Policy on Prison Population
Growth, 38 CRIME & DELINQ. 357, 357-68 (1992).
64. See TRACY L. HULING, U.S. COMM'N ON Civ. RIGHTS, PRISONS AS A GROWTH INDUS-
TRY IN RURAL AMERICA: AN EXPLORATORY DISCUSSION OF THE EFFECTS ON YOUNG AFRICAN
AMERICAN MEN IN THE INNER CITIES (1999), available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/
prisonsas rural_growth.shtml.
65. PETERSILIA, supra note 59, at 16.
66. Id. at 53.
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justice reforms are taking place primarily at the state and local levels where
the harm of mass incarceration and over-criminalization are intimately ex-
perienced.
Major reform of guideline sentencing has been underway since 2004,
when the legal landscape of sentencing changed precipitously. In 2004, the
Supreme Court decided Blakely v. Washington,67 which held that Washing-
ton State's statutory guideline system violated the Sixth Amendment by
permitting courts to impose enhanced sentences based on facts not found
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant. 68 At the
time, this type of guideline sentencing was an important procedural com-
ponent of roughly half of all state sentencing regimes. 69 Less than a year
later, the high Court addressed the constitutional infirmity of the federal
sentencing guidelines in light of the Blakely analysis. In Unites States v.
Booker, the Court found that the federal sentencing guidelines violated the
Sixth Amendment as previously applied because they direct judges to in-
crease sentences based on facts not found by a jury.70 The Booker Court
upheld the guidelines as a system of "effectively advisory" sentencing
rules. 71 As a result of the ruling, lower court judges now have discretion in
sentencing defendants unless the offense carries a mandatory sentence (as
specified in the law).72 It remains unclear what direction states, such as
New York, and the federal government will choose to take next in sentenc-
ing reform.
73
Although Booker left untouched a major source of racial disparity in
federal sentencing-mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine sales
and a 100-to-i sentence disparity between powder and crack cocaine-this
vestige of harsh federal "lock the door, and throw away the key" drug sen-
67. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
68. Id. at 303.
69. Bowman, supra note 61, at 1316.
70. 543 U.S. 220, 232 (2005).
71. Id. at 245.
72. Id.
73. Some scholars remain skeptical about the ability of Blakely, and particularly Booker(in the federal context), to dramatically rebalance the sentencing scale in light of Booker's
salvaging of the guidelines on an "advisory" basis, and given the part of the opinion that
creates appellate review of federal sentences on a reasonableness standard.
If the guidelines calculation and adherence to a guideline sentence become prima-
ry considerations in reasonableness review, then [the Court] has succeeded in
reinstituting the guidelines much as they were. The only theoretical difference is
that the guidelines will now best be characterized as presumptive rather than man-
datory. The only functional difference would be that we would still have guide-
lines with the force of law, but judges would have an expanded . . . power [to
make downward departures].
Bowman, supra note 61, at 1350.
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tences from the 1990s was abolished earlier this year when President Ob-
ama signed into law the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,7 4 reducing the gap
between crack and powder cocaine sentencing from 100-to-I to 18-to-1.75
In 2009, thirty-six years after initiating its harsher rules, New York
would again play a significant role in criminal sentencing reform. This
time, the Empire State reversed its course by eliminating mandatory mini-
mum prison sentences for most drug offenses (the sentencing arena un-
touched by Booker), expanding the use of alternatives to incarceration
(such as therapeutic courts and probation), reducing penalties for some re-
peat, nonviolent drug offenses, and providing for retroactive re-sentencing
of felons previously convicted under the Rockefeller Drug Laws. 76 Other
states are similarly scaling down harsh mandatory sentencing laws and re-
turning discretion to judges.77
This extraordinary shift away from severe criminal sentences toward an
approach to drug policy that instead focuses on rehabilitation can be cre-
dited to two principal factors: state budget shortfalls in a climate of eco-
nomic recession, 78 and strong public opinion in favor of alternatives to in-
carceration for non-violent drug offenders. 79 What New York and other
states have realized is that harsh punishment is more costly an approach to
drug addiction and abuse than treatment, particularly in a declining eco-
nomic climate.
74. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372.
75. Denise Lavoie & Bill Draper, Crack-Coke Sentence Disparity Persists, WASH. POST,
Sept. 12, 2010, at A02.
76. Drug Policy in New York: From the Rockefeller Drug Laws to a Health and Public
Safety Approach: Explaining the 2009 Reforms, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, www.drugpolicy.
org/statebystate/newyork/rdl/ (follow "RLD Reforms Explained" hyperlink) (last visited
Nov. 21, 2010).
77. Since 2001, when the nation's prison rate rose at the lowest rate since the onset of
the War on Drugs, several states have reduced their prison populations using a variety of
methods, including parole reforms, abolishing mandatory minimum sentences for some
crimes, and creating alternatives to incarceration. These states include Ohio, Michigan,
Texas, North Carolina, Alabama, and Louisiana. Press Release, Justice Policy Inst., States
Reduce Incarceration, Change Sentencing Laws to Address Fiscal Crises (Jan. 7, 2003) (on
file with author).
78. See generally PEW CTR. ON THE STATES: ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA
2008, at 30, available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/report-detail.aspx?id=3590 4 .
79. Id.; see also Jennifer Steinhauer, To Trim Costs, States Relax Hard Line on Prisons,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, at A01.
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II. A RECENT HISTORY OF THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM IN THE UNITED
STATES
Nearly forty years after Rockefeller's clarion call to arms, the American
immigration system is similarly referred to as "broken." Calls for more ri-
gorous immigration law enforcement and more punitive approaches to im-
migration law violators are echoing in legislative assemblies across the na-
tion, on the airwaves, and in the studios of conservative cable news pundits.
Yet the "severity revolution" within immigration law is already well un-
derway. Starting in the late 1980s, Congress aggressively began importing
criminal punishment methods and processes into immigration law en-
forcement and deportation processes as an extension of the war on drugs. 80
Scholars have described this as the criminalization of immigration law: an
ill-suited marriage of civil and criminal standards that reconfigures the
standards of both systems, and insulates the immigration system from many
reforms taking place within the criminal system.81
Harsh immigration law reforms enacted by the 104th Congress in 1996
prompted a wide-scale discussion among immigration law scholars of the
increasing punitiveness or "criminalization" of immigration law. 2 While
80. Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 35, at 625-26 (describing the war on drugs
as focusing attention on the inability of customs and immigration services to prevent contra-
band and foreign drug couriers from crossing U.S. borders; "[t]hese inadequacies within the
Immigration and Naturalization Service coupled with the emerging role of the U.S. border
as a 'crime scene' encouraged Congress to resort to the use of criminal penalties and en-
hanced law enforcement to staunch the flow of both contraband and illegal immigration
across the border").
81. See generally Jennifer M. Chac6n, Managing Migration through Crime, 109 Co-
LUM. L. REV. S1DEBAR 135 (2009); Jennifer M. Chac6n, Unsecured Borders: Immigration
Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1827-32 (2007);
Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-
September 11th "Pale of Law," 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 639, 640 (2004); Le-
gomsky, supra note 32, at 472; Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immi-
gration and Crime Control After September l1th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81 (2005) [he-
reinafter Miller, Blurring the Boundaries]; Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis:
Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376-77 (2006).
82. Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 34, at 634-35 ("The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ('AEDPA') expanded the scope of existing aggravated
felonies related to gambling, transportation for purposes of prostitution, alien smuggling,
passport fraud, and other forms of document fraud. The Act expanded the definition to in-
clude new offenses involving: obstruction of justice, perjury or bribery offenses for which a
sentence of at least five years or more may be imposed; commercial bribery, forgery, coun-
terfeiting and vehicle trafficking offenses for which a sentence of at least five years or more
may be imposed; offenses committed by an alien ordered previously deported; and offenses
relating to skipping bail for which a sentence of two or more years may be imposed. Five
months later, the IIRIRA not only expanded the definition of aggravated felonies once again
to include new offenses such as rape and sexual abuse of a minor, but it also lowered the
sentence length and monetary amount thresholds involved in many crimes defined as aggra-
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this discussion acknowledged the relationship between the regulation of
immigration and the control of crime dating to the exclusion of alien con-
victs as far back as 1875,83 and a recent tendency to regulate certain immi-
gration-related conduct of citizens and non-citizens alike, the 1996 legisla-
tion represented a sharp detour away from a civil, regulatory notion of
immigration law enforcement, and an exponential uptick in the use of crim-
inal theories, processes, and punishment.84 Never before had scholars
broadly discussed the relationship between certain immigration processes
(like deportation) and crime control in terms of a convergence or merger.
Equally unprecedented is the immigration system's larger societal role in
"governing through crime." 85
Today-some fourteen years after the 104th Congress-convergence of
the civil immigration system with the criminal punishment system (and the
resulting harm) is a well-established fact.86 Whereas the punitive impact of
deportation has been acknowledged for over a century, the civil immigra-
tion system now mimics the criminal justice system in its aggressive impor-
tation of criminal categories (e.g., "aggravated felons," "criminal aliens,"
ICE "Most Wanted" list), 87 criminal law enforcement mechanisms (e.g.,
"Operation Predator," "Operation Community Shield"),88 institutions of
vated felonies. For example, the IIRIRA lowered the amount of funds involved in a money
laundering crime to be considered an aggravated felony from $100,000 to $10,000 and lo-
wered to one year the sentence length required for many "crimes of violence" and theft of-
fenses to be considered aggravated felonies."); see also Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214.
83. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 4, 18 Stat. 477 (prohibition upon the importation of
alien convicts).
84. Legomsky, supra note 34, at 471 (noting that the unmistakable importation of the
criminal justice model into immigration law has created a displacement of the civil, regula-
tory model of immigration law).
85. See generally JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME (2007); Miller, Citi-
zenship & Severity, supra note 35, at 645.
86. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
87. In March 2003, ICE's Detention and Removal Office created a "Most Wanted" List
of "the most dangerous criminal aliens." Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Homeland Sec. of
the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong. 4 (2004) (statement of Michael Garcia, As-
sistant Secretary, ICE).
88. ICE has created several task forces that target select populations for removal, includ-
ing Operation Absconder, Operation Last Call, Operation Predator, Operation ICE Storm,
and Operation Return to Sender. See generally Jennifer Chac6n, Whose Community Shield?:
Examining the Removal of the "Criminal Street Gang Member, " 2007 U. CI. LEGAL F.
317, 344-45.
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criminal punishment (e.g., incarceration in county jails and immigration de-
tention facilities),89 and crime control rationales.9"
The immigration system is one unconstrained by the concerns of the
Framers about the exercise of governmental power on criminal suspects,
criminal defendants, and convicted criminals. However, this approach to
immigration in some instances exceeds the power of the criminal system,
importing criminal categories and attaching severe consequences to these
categories, without the corresponding obligation to afford processes that
narrow the risk of erroneous decisions and arbitrary exercise of govern-
mental power.91 Stephen Legomsky advances this notion when he persua-
sively argues that Unites States immigration policy has asymmetrically
adopted the language of criminal law enforcement without affording those
subject to its coercive power the same Due Process protections as the cri-
minally charged. 92
A. Dangerous Discourse
The immigration system's use of the vocabulary of criminal dangerous-
ness and its heavy use of incarceration illustrate the enhanced power of this
asymmetrical arrangement. For example, consider the use of the term "ag-
gravated felony" in the context of crime-based deportation. 93 As immigra-
tion scholars have discussed at length, the term "aggravated felony" as ap-
plied in the immigration context bears little resemblance to the same term
used in the criminal context.94 In the criminal context, an aggravated crime
is a crime considered more heinous due to the presence of certain circums-
tances such as commission of a crime with a deadly weapon, the youthful-
ness or vulnerability of the victim, or the element of reckless disregard in
the commission of the crime. 95 The perpetrator of the crime-the aggra-
vated felon-is usually subject to more severe penalties than if he or she
had committed the crime without those aggravating circumstances. 96 Con-
gress embraced this criminal category as a heightened rationale for manda-
tory detention and removal of certain non-citizen felons by fashioning more
89. Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 35, at 648.
90. Id. at 655 ("[I]mmigrants are increasingly managed through incapacitation.").
91. Legomsky, supra note 34, at 481.
92. Id.
93. Immigration and Naturalization Act § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006).
94. Miller, Citizenship & Severity, supra note 35, at 634 ("[T]he degree of severity of
crimes considered 'aggravated felonies' has lost a clear, rational connection to the nefarious
connotation it has in the criminal law."). The term "aggravated felony" is defined at 8
U.S.C. § 1101.
95. 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26:3(c)-(d) (2006).
96. See id.
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austere deportation laws.9 7 What began as a legislative means of ensuring
deportation as a consequence of a serious crime with aggravating factors
(initially restricted to murder, weapons trafficking, and drug trafficking)
has been expanded to encompass far less serious crimes with no aggravat-
ing circumstances. For example, a crime as minor as a misdemeanor may
constitute an aggravated felony in the immigration system.98 Furthermore,
in many instances an individual need only have committed a crime punish-
able by a sentence of at least one year in prison to be classified as an ag-
gravated felon, and subjected to mandatory detention prior to deportation.99
B. Over-Incarceration of Immigrants
Criminally enhanced civil regulation is also evident in the immigration
detention system. Detention has been used as a means of managing non-
U.S. citizens for over a hundred years, dating back to 1892, when the Unit-
ed States opened its first immigration detention facility at Ellis Island. 100
However, it is only within the past twenty years that immigration detention
has expanded beyond a few distinct facilities, into an expansive network of
custodial facilities varying dramatically in size, staffing, and supervision.
At the end of the 2008 fiscal year, ICE operated the largest detention and
supervised release program in the United States. 1 ' In 2008, a total of
378,582 non-U.S. citizens from 221 countries were in custody or super-
vised by ICE in a network of over 300 facilities throughout the United
States and its territories. 10 2 These facilities range from cells in small local
jails operated by county sheriff's departments leased by ICE to large immi-
gration service processing centers owned by ICE and operated by private
security companies.' 0 3 Fifty percent of the detained immigrant population
97. Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) (providing for deportation of
aggravated felons); id. § 236(c)(1)(B) (providing for mandatory detention of aggravated fe-
lons).
98. See, e.g., Biskupski v. Attorney General of U.S., 503 F.3d 274, 279 (3d Cir. 2007);
Gattem v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 758, 761 (7th Cir. 2005).
99. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(43) (enumerating aggravated felony
crimes for which the term of one year imprisonment or more subjects the non-U.S. citizen
convicted felon to mandatory detention, including: a crime of violence that is not purely a
political offense, § 101(a)(43)(F); a theft or burglary offense, § 101(a)(43)(G); a RICO of-
fense, § 101(a)(43)(J); an offense relating to commercial bribery, counterfeiting, or forgery,
§ 101(a)(43)(R); and an offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury, or bribery of a
witness, § 101(a)(43)(S)).
100. See Ellis Island Foundation, supra note 2.
101. DORA SCHRIRO, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMs ENFORCE-
MENT, IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2009).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 9-10.
2010]
FORDHAM URB. L.J.
is housed in county jails, alongside county prisoners and convicted fe-
lons. 104
Not only does the federal immigration detention system exceed all crim-
inal incarceration systems in size, it also operates on the model established
by the criminal system, with many of the same chronic problems: sub-
standard medical care,1" 5 deaths in detention, 10 6 inadequate mental health
care, 10 7 and custodial sexual abuse.'0 8 Immigration detainees are locked up
in facilities governed by penal norms, sent to disciplinary segregation when
they break the rules of the facility, stripped of their property, forced to wear
prison garb, and guarded by personnel trained to treat them as security
threats.0 9 These are conditions that seem inappropriate in light of the civil,
administrative authority under which they are being detained. Indeed, most
immigration detainees are held in custodial conditions more restrictive than
the average felon serving criminal time in a state prison." 0 Dora Schriro, a
career corrections administrator and former director of the Colorado De-
partment of Corrections, was recruited by the Obama Administration to
overhaul the nation's immigration detention system. During the six months
that Schriro served as director of the ICE Office of Detention Policy and
Planning, she wrote a report critical of the criminal conditions under which
immigration detainees are held, observing the irony that:
104. Id. at 10.
105. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DETAINED AND DISMISSED: WOMEN'S STRUGGLES TO OB-
TAIN HEALTH CARE IN UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION DETENTION (Mar. 17, 2009); FLORIDA
IMMIGRANT ADVOCACY CENTER, DYING FOR DECENT CARE: BAD MEDICINE IN IMMIGRATION
CUSTODY (Feb. 2009).
106. Nina Bernstein, Another Jail Death, and Mounting Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2009, at A14; Nina Bernstein, City of Immigrants Fills Jail Cells With Its Own, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 27, 2008; Nina Bernstein, Few Details on Immigrants Who Died in Custody, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 2008, at Al; Nina Bernstein, Ill and in Pain, Detainee Dies In U.S. Hands,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2008, at Al; Nina Bernstein, Man's Death in Private Immigration Jail
Bares Difficulty of Detention Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2009, at A13; Nina Bernstein,
New Scrutiny as Immigrants Die in Custody, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2007, http://www.
nytimes.com/2007/06/26/us/26detain.html; Nina Bernstein, Officials Hid Truth of Immi-
grant Deaths in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2010, at Al.
107. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, US: IMMIGRATION NEGLECTS HEALTH (Mar. 17, 2009),
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/03/17/us-immigration-detention-neglects-
health.
108. JUST DETENTION INT'L, SEXUAL ABUSE IN U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION (Jan. 2009),
available at http://www.justdetention.org/en/factsheets/immigrationfactsheet.pdf.
109. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries, supra note 81, at 199 n.210.
110. Despite the fact that non-U.S. citizens detained on crime-based grounds are being
deported for past criminal convictions, civil detention for administrative, regulatory purpos-
es should not resemble, or even exceed, the punitiveness of criminal incarceration. See, e.g.,
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 689, 724 (1893).
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As a matter of law, immigration detention is unlike criminal incarceration.
Yet immigration detention and criminal incarceration detainees tend to be
seen by the public as comparable, and both confined populations are typi-
cally managed in similar ways. Each group is ordinarily detained in se-
cure facilities with hardened perimeters in remote locations at considera-
ble distances from counsel and/or their communities. With only a few
exceptions, the facilities that ICE uses to detain aliens were originally
built, and currently operate, as jails and prisons to confine pre-trial and
sentenced felons. Their design, construction, staffing plans, and popula-
tion management strategies are based largely upon the principles of com-
mand and control. Likewise, ICE adopted standards that are based upon
corrections law and promulgated by correctional organizations to guide
the operation of jails and prisons .... These standards impose more re-
strictions and carry more costs than are necessary to effectively manage
the majority of the detained population. 11'
Schriro criticized the excessive level of restriction of ICE detention as
well as its resulting expense. 112 Schriro found the correctional principles of
command and control to be inappropriate for the population of immigration
detention." 3 One of the key recommendations of her report included intro-
ducing "management tools and informational systems to detain and super-
vise aliens in a setting consistent with [their] assessed risk."' 1 4 Schriro's
view of immigration detention is divorced from the standards, techniques,
and excessive cost of criminal incarceration. Had Schriro continued to di-
rect the ICE Office of Detention Policy and Planning, one can imagine her
reconstructing the nation's immigration detention system on a model more
consistent with deportation as a civil, regulatory, administrative system.
However, her resignation cast a shadow of reality on a bold, new recon-
struction of immigration detention going forward.
In addition to the over-incarceration of immigrants, ICE has inherited
other problems chronically plaguing the bloated criminal justice system,
including racial profiling," l5 mismanagement of the mentally ill,116 wrong-
111. SCHRIRO, supra note 101, at 10, 16. Schriro's findings included the following: a
high percentage (66%) of detainees were subject to mandatory detention, half (51%) had
felony convictions, and only 11% of those felons had committed violent crimes; the majori-
ty of the detainee population is characterized as having a low propensity for violence; the
vast majority of ICE detention facilities are built, and operated, as jails and prisons to con-
fine pre-trial and sentenced felons; and ICE is comprised primarily of law enforcement per-
sonnel with extensive expertise performing removal functions, but not in the design and de-
livery of detention facilities and community-based alternatives. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See generally TREVOR GARDNER, It & AARTI KOHLI, EARL WARREN INST., THE
C.A.P. EFFECT: RACIAL PROFILING IN THE ICE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM (2009).
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ful conviction (deportation)," 7 sexual abuse of detainees, including female
detainees," 8 and substandard health care. "19 Unlike the criminal punish-
ment system whose excesses have been checked by state budget crises, lack
of capacity, and severity fatigue on the part of voters, ICE is not similarly
constrained. After the 1996 reforms, and particularly in the wake of the
9/11 attacks, federal spending on immigration has soared. 2'
The specter of the asymmetrical arrangement that mimics the mechan-
isms and processes of crime control, and invokes the intensely punitive
public sentiment about criminals, also functions to conflate the tools of
crime and immigration control. The current use of immigration detainers
by immigration law enforcement authorities conflates civil and criminal au-
thority to arrest and detain individuals, and increasingly results in criminal
law enforcement officials violating Due Process guarantees. 121 In addition
to prolonging lawful criminal detention beyond the time legally authorized,
the deployment of immigration detainers within the criminal system has
produced other harmful distortions of criminal procedure. Immigration de-
tainers lodged against persons held in county jails on criminal charges
116. Bill Ong Hing, Systemic Failure: Mental Illness, Detention, and Deportation, 16
U.C. DAVISJ. INT'LL. &POL'Y 341 (2010).
117. Andrew Becker and Patrick J. McDonnell, U.S. Citizens Caught Up in Immigration
Sweeps, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2009, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-
citizen9-2009apr09,0,3056253.story; Suzanne Gamboa, AP Impact: Citizens Held as Illegal
Immigrants, MSNBC (Apr. 12, 2009), http://www.msnbc.com/id/301807291ns/usnews-
life.
118. See generally STOP PRISONER RAPE, No REFUGE HERE: A FIRST LOOK AT SEXUAL
ABUSE IN IMMIGRANT DETENTION (2004). In 2004, Stop Prisoner Rape, an organization
known for its advocacy concerning the sexual abuse of men in criminal custody, published
one of the early reports detailing problems of sexual abuse in U.S. immigration detention
centers. The report focused on three main issues: "(1) the considerable and troubling re-
ported record of sexual abuse of detainees, (2) the lack of substantive policies and proce-
dures in place to address such abuse, and (3) immigration officials' refusal to allow inde-
pendent monitoring of conditions for detainees." Id. The ACLU recently publicized the
sexual abuse of female detainees at a privately-operated detention facility in Texas. See gen-
erally Press Release, ACLU, Sexual Abuse of Female Detainees at Hutto Highlights Ongo-
ing Failure of Immigration Detention System, Says ACLU (Aug. 20, 2010) (on file with the
author).
119. Washington Post reporters Dana Priest and Amy Goldstein wrote a series of articles
in 2008 on the woeful inadequacy of medical care in immigration detention facilities and the
deaths in custody resulting from medical neglect. See, e.g., Dana Priest & Amy Goldstein,
Careless Detention: System of Neglect, WASH. POST, May 11, 2008, http://www.washington
post.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/immigration/index.html.
120. See generally Migration Pol'y Inst., Immigration Enforcement Spending Since IRCA
(2005), available at www.migrationpolicy.org/ITFIAF/FactSheetSpending.pdf.
121. Press Release, ACLU of Florida, ACLU: I.C.E. Detainers Unlawful and Pose Risks
to Local Governments (July 17, 2009), available at http://www.aclufl.org/newsevents/?
action-viewRelease&emailAlertlD=3763.
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commonly jeopardize the person's ability to obtain bail. A fundamental as-
sumption within penal modernism is the ability of people who are jailed to
return to their communities before trial upon the posting of bail to the court
and a judicial determination that the person is not a danger to the communi-
ty or a flight risk.12
2
C. Civil "Exceptionalism" Within Criminal Law Enforcement and
Punishment
The observation that this asymmetry operates to confuse civil and crimi-
nal law enforcement tools and to prolong detention that would be imper-
missible under the adjudicative, criminal model may be worse than Profes-
sor Legomsky suggests. It may be the case that the distortion is, in fact,
symmetrical. Just as the importing of criminal categories, objectives, and
theories distorts the immigration system, the importing of civil administra-
tive tools also distorts the adjudicative, Due Process-oriented criminal pu-
nishment system. This occurs by truncating procedures, eliminating crimi-
nal rationales, such as the possibility of bail, and creating an
exceptionalism for non-citizens in the criminal justice system-a situation
not contemplated by its designers. The use of ICE Detainers provides a
compelling example of civil, regulatory power distorting the criminal pu-
nishment system.
1. ICE Detainers Exempt Non-U.S. Citizens From Opportunities Broadly
Afforded to Prisoners
In addition to distorting criminal law enforcement processes,'23 ICE de-
tainers lodged against non-citizens in correctional custody result in their
exemption from basic services and opportunities broadly provided to con-
victed felons. For example, non-U.S. citizen inmates incarcerated in state
facilities have been denied opportunities to participate in educational, oc-
cupational, and work release programs on the ground that such rehabilita-
tive programs are reserved for inmates who will be released into "society."
Non-citizen prisoners have also been barred from assignment to minimum-
security facilities due to ICE detainers without regard to the minor nature
122. 18 USC 3142(f) provides that only persons who fit into certain categories are subject
to detention without bail: persons charged with a crime of violence, an offense for which the
maximum sentence is life imprisonment or death, certain drug offenses for which the maxi-
mum offense is greater than ten years, repeat felony offenders, or if the defendant poses a
serious risk of flight, obstruction of justice, or witness tampering. There is a special hearing
held to determine whether the defendant fits within these categories; anyone not within them
must be admitted to bail. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2006).
123. See generally supra note 34.
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of the offense or the proximity of their parole date.1 24 ICE detainers like-
wise exclude non-U.S. citizens in federal prisons from sentence reduction
programs aimed at encouraging them to seek substance abuse treatment.
ICE detainers have even operated to strip non-citizen prisoners of sentence
reduction credits earned prior to the issuance of the detainer, despite Due
Process protections for other losses of "good time" credit related to mis-
conduct. 125 Federal courts have condoned these practices on Due Process
and Equal Protection grounds. 12
6
2. ICE Detainers Adversely Affect the Provision of Criminal Bail to the
Criminally Charged
ICE detainers can dramatically increase the amount of bail non-citizens
are required to pay when they are accused of a crime. Although the right to
reasonable bail is enshrined in the Eighth Amendment, 2 7 when an ICE de-
tainer is placed on a non-U.S. citizen in state criminal custody the state may
increase dramatically the amount of bail the accused is required to pay on
the grounds that the detainer increases the risk of the accused failing to ap-
124. Franklin v. Barry, 909 F. Supp. 21, 29 (D.D.C. 1995).
125. Hector A. Camarena, a federal prisoner, completed a drug rehabilitation program
entitling him to sentence reduction of up to one year. After the Bureau of Prison (BOP) de-
termined that Camarena was eligible for early release, ICE subsequently issued a detainer
stating that it was investigating whether Camarena was deportable. The BOP subsequently
rescinded Camarena's earned credit. In Camarena v. Slade, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a
district court order denying the prisoner's petition for writ of habeas corpus. 107 F. App'x
821 (9th Cir. 2004). However, one of the three judges strongly dissented. Id. at 823. De-
scribing the situation as "Kafkaesque," Circuit Judge Pregerson pointed out that had Cama-
rena been deprived of good time credit for misconduct, he would have a range of rights to
challenge the decision. Id. But notice of a possible civil immigration charge was sufficient
to deprive him of those Due Process rights, and prevent him from challenging the validity of
the detainer. Id.
126. McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1184 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the exclusion
of prisoners with ICE detainers from sentence reduction programs involving supervision in a
halfway house was permissible because prisoners subject to possible deportation upon re-
lease from custody have an incentive to escape custody whereas prisoners without detainers
are more likely to complete the program in order to rejoin their communities); Duarte v.
Washington, 2010 WL 3522514, at *5 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 7, 2010) (holding that the exclu-
sion of prisoners with ICE detainers from educational, vocational, rehabilitation, and other
treatment programs does not violate the Equal Protection clause); see, e.g., United States v.
Tamayo, 162 F. App'x 813, 816 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[T]here is a rational basis to deem de-
portable aliens, who will be sent out of the country after the term of their sentence, ineligible
for programs geared toward rehabilitating prisoners who will re-enter society after their re-
lease from confinement."); Ruiz-Loera v. United States, 2000 WL 33710839, at *2 (D. Utah
June 23, 2000) (deterring further re-entry, avoiding risk of flight, and saving expenses are
legitimate bases to treat deportable persons differently).
127. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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pear at trial. For non-citizens facing criminal charges, this frustrates their
ability to adequately prepare a defense, and fails to deter the state from jail-
ing innocent people. For example, in New Jersey v. Fajardo-Santos, an
ICE detainer was placed on a non-U.S. citizen nearly four months after his
arrest for sexual assault.128 After the defendant procured bail in the amount
of $75,000 in exchange for release from custody, he was turned over to ICE
and placed in federal custody. His bail was then increased to $300,000
cash on the ground that the detainer increased the risk that the defendant
would not appear for trial. 129 He was then transferred back to state custody
on the trial court's order to produce.'
30
When defendant Fajardo-Santos appealed the fourfold increase in bail,
his application for reduction of bail was initially granted on the ground that
the foreseeable transfer to ICE custody prompted by the detainer did not
constitute a "change of circumstance" sufficient to justify the increase in
bail.' 3 ' The appellate court reinstated the $75,000 bail and ordered Fajar-
do-Santos returned to ICE custody where he would have the opportunity to
post his criminal bond and then "participate in the defense of both proceed-
ings."'132 However, on appeal the state supreme court reversed and reins-
tated the $300,000 bail amount, albeit with an admonishment to the prose-
cutor that bail modifications based upon the lodging of an ICE detainer
should be filed in a timely fashion, and not after the defendant has posted
bail. 13
3
Despite the virtual certainty that a criminal defendant with an ICE de-
tainer will remain in either state or federal custody due to the compound
authority of both the criminal and civil systems being exercised over him or
her, criminal bail can reach exorbitant heights as a reflection of a defen-
dant's greater motivation to flee from custody. Thus the deployment of
civil, regulatory immigration power within the confines of the criminal sys-
tem distorts the rationale of providing bail to the criminally charged, i.e., a
rational connection between higher risk of flight and higher bail.
III. BIGGER PICTURE: IMPORTING THE CRIMINAL SYSTEM'S SEVERITY
ABSENT ITS REFORMS
In October 2009, Janet Napolitano sketched an outline of reforms to the
immigration detention system, pledging to transform it from a patchwork of
128. 973 A.2d 933, 935 (N.J. 2009).
129. Id. at 935-36.
130. Id. at 936.
131. Id. at 933.
132. Id. at 936.
133. Id. at 935.
2010]
FORDHAM URB. L.J.
jail and prison cells into a "truly civil detention system."' 3 4 The contours
of that plan included the creation of a new Office of Detention Policy and
Planning under the (subsequently short-lived) leadership of well-regarded
career correctional administrator Dora Schriro. The following month, DHS
Secretary Janet Napolitano announced the Obama administration's plans to
overhaul the entire U.S. immigration system to focus enforcement on the
most dangerous illegal immigrants and criminal aliens.1 35  She described
impending reforms as a "three-legged stool" that would balance tougher
immigration law enforcement and a "tough and fair" pathway to earned le-
galization (for illegal immigrants) with a streamlined legal immigration
system. 136 Napolitano stressed the significance of enforcement agreements
with state and local law enforcement agencies, referring to them as "force-
multipliers" in the apprehension of "dangerous criminal aliens."' 37 She
lauded the expansion of the Secure Communities Program and its effec-
tiveness in identifying criminal aliens and illegal aliens booked into local
jails. 138
One year later, reform advocates are still awaiting the promised wide-
ranging reforms. Evaluating the administration's progress in the year fol-
lowing Napolitano's announcement, the ACLU contends that the immigra-
tion enforcement system continues to over-rely on "prolonged detention
practices [that] deny detainees their most basic element of due process.,"139
The organization further charges that immigrants who pose no danger or
risk of flight are still being locked up long term without a bond hearing be-
fore an immigration judge. 14  Substandard medical care, sexual abuse of
detainees, and limited services to mentally disabled detainees lacking the
mental competency to represent themselves are chronic deficiencies the
ACLU raised as evidence of systemic failure unlikely to be solved "in the
134. Nina Bernstein, U.S. To Reform Policy on Detention for Immigrants, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/06/us/politics/O6detain.html?ref-nina_
berstein.
135. Julia Preston, White House Plan on Immigration Includes Legal Status, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 14, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/14/us/politics/14immig.html.
136. Id.
137. DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano Discusses Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 86
No. 44 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2812 (2009).
138. Id.
139. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Says Nation's Broken Immigration Detention System
Still Urgently Needs Reform-Few Strides Have Been Made Under Obama And Much
More Still Needs To Be Done (October 6, 2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/
immigrants-rights/aclu-says-nations-broken-immigration-detention-system-still-urgenty-
needs-reform.
140. Id.
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absence of independent external oversight.",141 The media raised these is-
sues as well. 1
42
While there is some evidence that ICE policies have changed, 143 the Ob-
ama administration has premised the promised reforms on taking a more
aggressive approach toward dangerous illegal and "criminal" aliens, and a
softer approach to less threatening non-U.S. citizens who run afoul of im-
migration laws. Not only is this strategy problematic (for reasons I will
discuss shortly), but it is inconsistent with the actual policies being imple-
mented by ICE. For example, the disclosure of a memo written by James
M. Chaparro, the director of ICE's Detention and Removal Operations
(DRO) in March 2010 cast doubt upon the sincerity, or at least the consis-
tent implementation of promised reforms from ICE's administrative leader-
ship down to the field officers. The memo directed DRO officers nation-
wide to boost deportation numbers, make maximum use of detention, and
detain more people suspected only of unauthorized status. These enforce-
ment priorities are in direct contradiction to those set forth by DHS Secre-
tary Janet Napolitano and ICE Assistant Secretary John Morton who both
repeatedly testified, for much of the past year, that ICE's priority is the de-
portation of dangerous criminal offenders.' 
44
Whereas the criminal punishment system has shifted away from penal
severity, the immigration law enforcement and detention system has been
slower to reduce the harms it has generated, despite the Obama administra-
tion's stated commitment to immigration reform. Structural reasons ac-
count for much of the immigration system's failure to follow criminal re-
forms.
First, as the subject of federal regulation, immigration enforcement (and
its criminalization) has been fueled by a national security budget with
pockets far deeper than that of any state criminal justice system. For ex-
141. Id.
142. Nina Bernstein, For a Mentally Ill Immigrant, a Path Clears Out of the Dark Maze
of Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009, at A20 (describing the prolonged detention of a
mentally disturbed asylum seeker, frequently in solitary confinement); Dana Priest & Amy
Goldstein, System of Neglect: As Tighter Immigration Policies Strain Federal Agencies, The
Detainees in Their Care Often Pay a Heavy Price, WASH. POST, May 11, 2008, at AI (dis-
cussing medical neglect of immigration detainees, and citing eighty-three deaths in deten-
tion from 2003-2008).
143. Deportations of convicted criminals rose by 19% in 2009 and are on pace to rise by
40% this year. Conversely, deportations of non-criminal illegal immigrants fell 3 percent
and are on pace to drop 33% this year. Spencer S. Hsu & Andrew Becker, ICE Officials Set
Quotas to Deport More Illegal Immigrants, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2010, at A04, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 20 10/03/26/AR20 10032604891.
html.
144. Id.
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ample, the total proposed 2011 budget for homeland security is approx-
imately $5.5 billion. 145 Of that figure, ICE plans to spend $5.34 million to
finance its operations. 146 This figure represents more than twice the total
2007 budget for corrections alone in New York State, and more, by far,
than any single state spent on corrections in 2007, with the sole exception
of the deeply debt-ridden state of California.147
Budgetary crises have forced states to reexamine over-incarceration and
downsize their prison populations. In contrast to the categorical "get
tough" approach of recent decades, states like Kansas, Michigan, New
York, and New Jersey are adopting evidence-based policies to reduce their
prison populations and promote cost-effective approaches to public safety
with demonstrable results. 148 State budgetary constraints, and the factors
that contribute to them, have had little effect on the growth of the federal
immigration detention system. To the contrary, the increasing criminaliza-
tion of immigration violations has provided sizable financial incentives to
promote and expand immigration detention. Indeed, the America's Pro-
gram, a non-profit policy studies center founded by the International Rela-
tions Center, recently reported on the profitability of the private sector, tax-
payer-funded, immigration detention industry and its aggressive political
lobbying practices.' 49
Second, immigration law enforcement and the deportation system are in-
sulated from most of the social harms that states experienced in the 1990s
(and continue to experience) after adopting harsh criminal reforms. Unlike
the criminal system, which has embraced re-entry initiatives in order to re-
duce the harms caused by dramatic increases in prison populations in recent
decades, 5 ' the immigration enforcement system has no such initiatives.
There is no re-entry for deportees. 151 By transporting deportees to the
country of their citizenship, ICE is permitted to externalize the costs of
their support without regard for individualized justice. 152 In the case of
145. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ICE FISCAL YEAR 2011 OVERVIEW CONGRESSIONAL
JUSTIFICATION 3, available at www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/securecommunities/fy201 lover
viewcongressionaljustification.pdf.
146. Id. at 86.
147. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 78.
148. GREENE & MAUER, supra note 54.
149. Peter Cervantes-Gautschi, Wall Street and the Criminalization of Immigrants,
AMERICA'S PROGRAM BLOG (June 10, 2010), http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/3304.
150. JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER
REENTRY 309-11 (2005).
151. Moreover, re-entry by individuals who have been ordered removed has been crimi-
nally punished since 1996.
152. Even when a non-U.S. citizen ordered removed has resided in the United States
since infancy, that individual is deportable to the country of his or her citizenship---a coun-
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non-U.S. citizen criminal offenders, but for their citizenship status, these
individuals would generally be eligible for post-release re-entry services to
aid their transition from the prison to the street. Under the deportation re-
gime, the public does not have to contend with the consequences of quasi-
criminal immigration law enforcement, detention, and removal because
(apart from the impact on deportees' families) the impact is primarily felt
abroad.
Third, the public outrage that was once so prominently directed toward
criminal offenders consistent with the ascendancy of neo-liberal political
values under President Reagan (and later under Presidents George H. W.
Bush and George W. Bush) has weakened as the excesses of penal severity
became unsustainable. For example, as state budgets for higher education
were cut to support a rapidly expanding prison system, 5 3 taxpayers began
to question the logic of unchecked prison expansion. With the realization
that prison growth was being fueled by mandatory minimum sentences
meted out to non-violent felony drug offenders, the public began to support
drug treatment and other alternatives to incarceration, as well as prison
downsizing measures, such as early release programs, and the repeal of
mandatory minimum sentences. 154  However, negative public regard of
immigrants-particularly those whose violation of immigration regulations
renders them deportable 155-remains consistently high. For example, a re-
cent poll taken by Quinnipiac University's Polling Institute reflects wide-
spread public sentiment (66%) favoring stricter immigration law enforce-
ment rather than assimilating immigrants into American society. 156 Not
only did a majority (51%) of those polled support the aggressive law en-
forcement and harsh criminal penalties for undocumented migrants enacted
try that may be completely foreign to the deportee. In addition, there is a wealth of evidence
to suggest that U.S. citizens have been unlawfully deported. However, the removal system
has no process by which unlawfully deported citizens can return to the United States. Da-
niel Kanstroom, Director of the Boston College Post-Deportation Human Rights Project, has
commented that "the legal system has not developed a mechanism to right that wrong for
the thousands of people who have been wrongly deported." Nina Bernstein, For Those De-
ported, Court Rulings Come Too Late, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2010, at Al.
153. By 1999, New York State spent $100 million more on its correctional budget than
its entire state university system. GREENE & MAUER, supra note 54.
154. See generally MARK KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FALLS (2009).
155. This group includes visa overstayers, out-of-status visa holders, non-citizens who
surreptitiously cross the border, and non-citizens with criminal convictions. See Immigration
& Nationality Act § 237(a).
156. From May 19-24, 2010, Quinnipiac University surveyed 1914 registered voters na-
tionwide with a margin of error of +/- 2.2 percentage points. Poll Release, Quinnipiac Univ.
Polling Inst., More U.S. Voters Want Arizona-Like Immigration Law, Quinnipiac Universi-
ty National Poll Finds (Jun. 1, 2010), available at http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1284.xml?
ReleaseID= 1460&What =&strA rea = ;&strTime= 3.
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by Arizona in its Senate Bill 1070, they supported it despite a 45% belief
by voters that it will lead to discrimination against Hispanics. 5 7 The re-
sults of this poll are borne out by the introduction, or proposed introduc-
tion, in at least twenty-two states of legislation mimicking the provisions of
Senate Bill 1070.158
CONCLUSION
Nearly forty years ago, the criminal justice system embraced a new phi-
losophy for dealing with crime. Encouraged by the growing popularity of a
conservative "tough on crime" movement, the criminal justice system in-
vested heavily in tough criminal law enforcement and incarceration.
Roughly twenty years later, the immigration law enforcement system fol-
lowed the criminal justice system down the same precipitous path, jumping
off the same severity cliff. Subsequently, the criminal system was made to
come to terms with the harsh, economically unsustainable system. Howev-
er, structural impediments including a virtually limitless national security
budget and costs that are externalized beyond the border, cast doubt upon
the likelihood that the current harsh system of immigration enforcement
will be reformed any time soon.
157. Id.
158. Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Ok-
lahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah-have introduced or
are considering introducing similar legislation. Arizona is Not the First State to Take Immi-
gration Matters Into Their Own Hands, IMMIGR. POL'Y CTR. (May 14, 2010), http://www.
immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/arizona-not-first-state-take-immigration-matters-their-own-
hands.
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